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ARTICLES
COMPETING PARADIGMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER IN "THE WAR ON TERRORISM"
JOHN S. BAKER, JR.*
[W]e ... need to think more systematically and universally about
the issue of combatants. Two years into the war on terror, it is time
to move beyond case-by-case development. We need to debate a
long-term and sustainable architecture for the process of determin-
ing when, why, and for how long someone may be detained as an
enemy combatant, and what judicial review should be available.
-The Honorable Michael Chertoff1
The inaptly named "war on terrorism"2  has inspired
polarized reactions which, consciously or not, rest on different
paradigms of how the three branches of the federal government
relate to each other in the exercise of our nation's sovereign
power to defend itself. On one side, the Bush administration has
attempted to enhance and consolidate executive power in its
* Dale E. Bennett Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisi-
ana State University. J.D., University of Michigan; Ph.D., University of London;
B.A., University of Dallas.
1. Michael Chertoff, Law, Loyalty, and Terror: Our Legal Response to the Post-
9/11 World, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec. 1, 2003, at 15, 17. On February 15,
2005,Judge Chertoff was sworn in as the second Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security. He formerly served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit from 2003 to 2005 and as head of the Justice Department's Crimi-
nal Division from 2001 to 2003.
2. For an example of why the label "war on terrorism" is inaccurate, see
ROGER SCRUTON, THE WEST AND THE REST (2002). Dr. Scruton states:
[T]he idea of a "war on terrorism" makes little sense. Terrorism is
not, after all, an enemy, but a method used by the enemy. The enemy
is of two kinds: a tyrant dictator, and the religious fanatic whom the
tyrant protects. To act against the first is feasible, if we are prepared to
play by the tyrant's rules. But to act against the second requires a
credible alternative to the absolutes with which he conjures. It
requires us not merely to believe in something, but to study how to put
our beliefs into practice.
Id. at 161.
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fight against terrorists. The Patriot Act3 enhances the Execu-
tive's investigative powers, while the Intelligence Act4 is supposed
to consolidate the power of intelligence gathering. At least for
some in the administration, the underlying paradigm is that of a
consolidated State, exemplified by the willingness to erode the
distinction between internal law enforcement and military/war
powers. Even though the Framers centralized military power in
the federal government, they rejected a consolidated state as
inconsistent with liberty. 5 The administration's failure to articu-
late adequately its concern for liberty, while pursuing security,
has made it unnecessarily vulnerable to charges that its policies
jeopardize civil liberties.
Unfortunately, the Bush administration has allowed the
opposition to claim the mantle of liberty in the "war on terror-
ism." The most visible, aggressive, and libertarian opponent has
been the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU").' The oppo-
sition is not monolithic, however. Between administration cheer-
leaders and die-hard opponents, there are those who support
some and oppose other aspects of the "war on terrorism." Never-
theless, in the media, the conflict is framed simply as one
between those for liberty and those for security. The main oppo-
sition, like the administration, does not generally distinguish law
enforcement from the exercise of war powers. Thus, because the
Bush administration and the opposition agree on such a funda-
mental premise, the opposition has been able to avoid the most.
serious objection to its efforts to extend its libertarian paradigm
from domestic law enforcement into the arena of foreign and
defense matters. That is, by rhetorically mixing police and mili-
3. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of
2001, 18 U.S.C. § 1960 [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
4. Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108458, 118 Stat. 3638.
5. See, e.g., Ti-iE FEDERALIST Nos. 39, 47 (James Madison, John Jay, and
Alexander Hamilton, writing as Publius) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
6. The ACLU was the first to file suit challenging the USA PATRIOT Act
with the case of Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor v. John Ashcroft, No.
03-72913 (E.D. Mich. filedJuly 30, 2003). See Press Release, American Civil Lib-
erties Union, PATRIOT Act Fears Are Stifling Free Speech, ACLU Says in Chal-
lenge to Law (Nov. 3, 2003), at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/
SafeandFree.cfm?ID=14307&c=262 (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy). There are other organizations, notably the Cato
Institutc, which reflect a different libertarian outlook. See Cato Institute, About
Cato, at http://w%w.cato.org/about/about.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). The Cato
Institute "is named for Cato's Letters, a series of libertarian pamphlets that
helped lay the philosophical foundation for the American Revolution." Id.
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tary powers, the administration has facilitated the argument for
extending judicial oversight from law enforcement to military
powers.
In 2004, the Supreme Court decided three cases related to
"the war on terrorism": Rasul v. Bush,7 Hamdi v. Rumsfeldj and
Rumsfeld v. Padilla.9 Rasul, which is listed first, out of order, was
very damaging to presidential power. No doubt stunning the
administration, ° Rasul extended habeas corpus jurisdiction to
aliens detained at Guantanamo Naval Base. Although Rasul was
a statutory holding, it clearly highlighted the issues of the judici-
ary's intrusion into military matters. For the first time, the Court
created a judicial check on the President's Commander in Chief
powers, when those powers are exercised outside the United
States.l"
Between the two paradigms, one statist and the other liberta-
rian, stands another: an originalist one-that of the Constitu-
tion's design for liberty. The originalist paradigm is more
nuanced than the other two paradigms, which are reductionist.
These nuances are reflected in the opinions of the Court's only
two real originalists, Justices Scalia and Thomas, who joined in
dissenting in Rasul and then opposed each other in separate dis-
sents in Hamdi.' As they agree, the federal government as a
whole has been given all the power necessary to protect the
nation's liberty.' 3 Their disagreement over the nature of the
restraints on the exercise of military power within the United
States reflects concerns dating from the Founding. 4 Those his-
7. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
8. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
9. 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
10. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2710 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Commander
in Chief and his subordinates had every reason to expect that the internment of
combatants at Guantanamo Bay would not have the consequence of bringing
the cumbersome machinery of our domestic courts into military affairs.").
11. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(rejecting the claim that the President can exercise military power as Com-
mander in Chief within the United States without congressional authorization).
12. This is not to imply that opinions by the other justices in the
examined cases lack nuance. The particulars of the various opinions are dis-
cussed infra in Part 1.
13. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2682 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ('Justice Scalia
apparently does not disagree that the Federal Government has all power neces-
sary to protect the Nation.").
14. As to matters of national defense, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS defend the
proposition embedded in the Constitution that "[t]he authorities essential to
the common defence ... to raise armies-to build and equip fleets-to pre-
scribe rules for the government of both-to direct their operations-to provide
for their support ... ought to exist without limitation." THE FEDERALIST No. 23,
2005]
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torical concerns involve the use of military force primarily against
American citizens, unlike the novel proposition in Rasul that
courts can restrain the President's exercise of military power
against external enemies.
The Constitution structures separation of powers to protect
liberty by strengthening the federal judiciary and the President.15
In international matters, the federal judiciary has an important
role vis-d-vis the states, namely to keep them from interfering in
international matters. Not only does the Constitution give the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction "[iin all cases affecting
Ambassadors, Public Ministers and Consuls,"16 it also gives Con-
gress the power to define offenses against the Law of Nations. 7
Given the Founders' understanding of the Law of Nations as the
realm of sovereigns"8 and their creation of an energetic Execu-
tive largely to deal with other sovereigns, they had no notion that
the Supreme Court would check the President outside the
United States. The Constitution distinguishes matters of internal
order, where the protection of liberty demands dividing power,
from external matters of defense, where the defense of liberty
requires unity of power.
Rasul, although only a statutory holding, indicates the will-
ingness of the six-member majority to reconstruct the structure
of separated powers in ways that will limit the President's exercise
of power in defending the nation's liberty. Of course, those jus-
tices certainly do not believe they are threatening liberty. On the
contrary, they must believe that they are advancing the protec-
supra note 5, at 147. That proposition prompted objections to the Constitution
on the ground that its allowance of standing armies in times of peace repre-
sented a threat to the liberties of the people. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 24-29,
supra note 5. Opponents argued, inter alia, that the military would be required
to enforce federal laws. See THE FEDERALIST No. 27, supra note 5. While admit-
ting that occasionally the national government might have to resort to force,
THE FEDERALIST No. 27 explained that the military would not normally be
required because the structure of the Constitution would incline citizens of the
states to obey the law. Id.
15. See THE FEDERALISr Nos. 47-51, supra note 5.
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
17. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 5.
The power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas, and offences against the law of nations, belongs with
equal propriety to the general government; and is a still greater
improvement on the articles of confederation. These articles contain
no provision for the case of offenses against the law of nations; and
consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to
embroil the confederacy with foreign nations.
Id. at 280-81.
18. SeeJEREMY RABKIN, WIHY SoVEREIGNTy MA-ITERs 23-27 (1998).
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tion of liberty by extending their oversight of the President
beyond our borders. Consciously or not, however, they operate
under a paradigm about the distribution of sovereign power in
external affairs that differs radically from that of the Framers.
The three dissenters in Rasul would decide in accord with the
Framers' paradigm regarding presidential power in matters of
external national defense. As indicated by their three different
positions in Hamdi, however, they adhere to different paradigms
regarding the President's exercise of military power within the
United States.
While Rasul was not a constitutional holding, there are indi-
cations elsewhere that members of the Court are prepared, at
some point, to constitutionalize the constraints on the Presi-
dent's exercise of his Commander in Chief powers exercised any-
where in the world.1 9 This article explains Rasul, along with
Hamdi and Padilla, with a view to promoting legislative amend-
ment of the habeas statute in order to repeal the result in Rasul
before the Court has the opportunity to revisit the question of
the President's power to detain enemy aliens outside U.S. sover-
eign territory.
I. THE TERRORISM CASES DECIDED IN 2004
The three "war on terrorism" cases decided by the Supreme
Court in 2004-Rasul v. Bush,2° Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,2 1 and Rumsfeld
v. Padilla 22 -presented complementary factual situations: (1) for-
eigners captured and held in military custody outside the U.S. (at
Guantanamo)-Rasul; (2) a presumptive American citizen cap-
tured and initially held by the military outside the U.S. (at Guan-
tanamo), but then transferred to a military facility inside the
U.S.-Hamdi; and (3) an American citizen arrested and initially
19. Prior to the decisions in the terrorism cases, Justice Ginsburg pre-
dicted that in an encounter between the United States and non-resident aliens:
[T] he position taken in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
would one day accurately describe our law. "[W]herever the United
States acts," the Restatement projects, "it can only act in accordance
with the limitations imposed by the Constitution." With human rights
increasingly prominent on the world's agenda, that day may come
sooner rather than later.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Per-
spective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REv. 1, 7-8 (2003) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 721
note 1 (1978) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (plurality
opinion))).
20. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
21. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
22. 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
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held by law enforcement in the U.S. and then transferred to mili-
tary custody in the U.S.-Padilla. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decisions, many considered Padilla the most significant and con-
troversial of the three cases because the arrest in the U.S. of an
American citizen made his subsequent military detention the
most difficult for the government to justify. On the other side,
despite intense international interest in Rasul, history and estab-
lished precedent, Johnson v. Eisentrager," seemed strongly to favor
the Justice Department. The elements of Hamdi-an American
held in military custody in the U.S. but captured by the military
during the war in Afghanistan and held as an "enemy combat-
ant"-placed it somewhere in between these two.
The results in Padilla and Rasul confounded these expecta-
tions, while Hamdi was muddled in the middle with a partial vic-
tory for the government from a plurality opinion and judgment
which ultimately favored the petitioner. 24 The majority opinion
in Padilla did not reach the merits but, instead, held that the
petition for habeas corpus25 was filed in the wrong federal dis-
trict court. The majority in Rasul held that federal district courts
have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus challenges to the legality
of their military detention,26 as well as other federal claims27 filed
by aliens held in military custody outside the United States. Iron-
ically, the majority in Padilla held an American in military cus-
tody inside the United States strictly to the text of the habeas
statute by requiring him to bring his challenge where he is
detained,28 while a different majority in Rasul interpreted the
23. 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that an alien enemy engaged in the
service of a government at war with the United States has no constitutional
right to personal security or immunity from military trial and punishment).
24. Justice Souter concurred in the judgment "to give practical effect to
the conclusions of eight members of the Court rejecting the Government's
position." 124 S. Ct. at 2660 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Souter thought the result would "benefit" Hamdi. Indeed, Hamdi was later
released as part of a deal in which he renounced his citizenship. See 'Enemy
Combatant' Hamdi to be Freed, UNITED PRESS INT'L (WASHINGTON), Sept. 22, 2004;
see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Transfer of Detainee Control Com-
pleted (Oct. 11, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr200410
11-1371.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
26. See id. § 2242.
27. The Court held that federal district courts have jurisdiction, based on
28 U.S.C. § 1331, over petitioners' claims under the Alien Tort Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1350. See 124 S. Ct. at 2698-99.
28. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2722 (2004) (quoting Carbo v.
United States, 364 U.S. 611, 618 (1961) ("[W]ith respect to habeas petitions
'designed to relieve an individual from oppressive confinement,' the traditional
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same text to allow aliens held in military custody outside the
United States to file for habeas corpus effectively in any of the
federal district courts.2 9
As has often occurred in the Supreme Court opinions, this
anomaly was attributable to Justice O'Connor and, to some
extent, Justice Kennedy. Both signed on to the majority opinion
in Padilla, with Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, also
writing a concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor, however,
joined the majority opinion in Rasul, which directly conflicts with
the Padilla majority. Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, did not
join the Rasul majority; he wrote separately, concurring only in
the judgment. His two concurring opinions are consistent. The
concurrence in Padilla posited possible exceptions to the normal
habeas rules such that "a petition may be properly filed in any
one of the federal district courts," citing Rasul as such an excep-
tion. Justice Kennedy's Rasul opinion attempted to explain the
result as a limited exception to the normal habeas rule:
In light of the status of Guantanamo Bay and the indefinite
pretrial detention of the detainees, I would hold that fed-
eral court jurisdiction is permitted in these cases. This
approach would avoid creating automatic statutory author-
ity to adjudicate the claims of persons located outside the
United States and remains true to the reasoning of
Eisentrager.30
Experience has shown that exceptions have a way of becom-
ing the general rule. Justice Stevens argued in his Padilld3 dis-
sent for an exception to the territorial rule for those held in the
United States. Writing the majority opinion in Rasul, in which
Justice O'Connor joined, Justice Stevens rendered the territorial
rule irrelevant outside the United States-as indeed it could not
apply for habeas relief to be available. Steven's statement of the
holding in Rasul references Guantanamo Bay, but the rationale
as stated in the previous sentence interprets the statute to
require only the ability to reach the defendant with service of
process.3 2 Had Justice Stevens' view also prevailed in Padilla, the
rule has always been that the Great Writ is 'issuable only in the district of
confinement.' ")).
29. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2695 (2004).
30. Id. at 2699, 2701 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
31. See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2730 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698.
No party questions the District Court's jurisdiction over petitioners' cus-
todians.... Section 2241, by its terms, requires nothing more. We
therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District Courtjurisdiction to
20051
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territorial rule would have been reduced to nothing more than
an exception.
With the Rasul and Padilla majorities in direct conflict, it was
not surprising that Hamdi, the case "in between," was muddled
without a majority opinion. Hamdi was the only one of the three
cases that really addressed constitutional issues of separation of
powers directly.3" The differing opinions turn on the interplay
of two issues: (1) Did Congress authorize military detention of an
American citizen in Hamdi's circumstances? (2) What inquiry
could a federal court make in such circumstances?
On the first question, five justices-the plurality of Justice
O'Connor, joined by the ChiefJustice, and Justices Kennedy and
Breyer,34 plus Justice Thomas 3 5-accepted the Government's
position that Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force
(the "AUMF")"6 authorized the military detention on U.S. soil of
an American citizen claimed to be an "enemy combatant." Jus-
tice Thomas dissented, however. He rejected the plurality's
expanded habeas corpus inquiry, which he said violated the Pres-
ident's power in our structure of separation of powers.3 7 Four
hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their
detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
By 'jurisdiction," the Court means only the ability to reach the petitioners'
custodian with service of process:
In Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95
(1973), this Court held . . . that the prisoner's presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of the district court is not "an invariable prereq-
uisite" to the exercise of district court jurisaiction under the federal
habeas statute. Rather, because "the writ of habeas corpus does not
act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds
him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody," a district court acts
"within [its] respective jurisdiction" within the meaning of § 2242 as
long as the "custodian can be reached by service of process."
Id. at 2695.
33. Justice Kennedy did make a passing reference to "the backdrop of the
constitutional command of the separation of powers" in his concurring opinion
in Rasul. 124 S. Ct. at 2699 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Indi-
rectly, of course, separation of powers is implicit in the discussion of subject
matter jurisdiction and interpretation of the habeas corpus statute which
appear in several of the opinions in the other two cases.
34. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641-42.
35. Id. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
36. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
37. Hamdi, 124 S.-Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
I agree with the plurality that the Federal Government has power to
detain those that the Executive Branch determines to be enemy com-
batants. But I do not think that the plurality has adequately explained
the breadth of the President's authority to detain enemy combatants,
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justices-Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens-disagreed that the AUMF
authorized military detention of an American citizen on U.S. soil.
The two pairs split, however, on what Congress would have to do
in order to authorize such detention. Justices Souter and Gins-
burg would require an act with "a clear statement" by Congress in
order to satisfy the Non-Detention Act,3
8 which bars detention of
a citizen "except pursuant to an Act of Congress."
3 9 Justices
Scalia and Stevens would require a suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus by Congress pursuant to the Constitution.
4"
On the second issue, eight of the justices-all but Justice
Thomas-agreed in rejecting the Government's position.
4" The
government had argued that "Hamdi has no basis for any chal-
lenge by petition for habeas except to his own status as an enemy
combatant and even that challenge may go no further than to
enquire whether 'some evidence' supports Hamdi's designa-
tion. 4"" Without the same majority on both issues, the Court pro-
duced a judgment only when Justice Souter, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment so that there would be
one.
43
In such a gumbo of opinions-with unusual and shifting
groupings in the three cases, only one of which addresses consti-
tutional issues of separation of powers directly-discerning any
paradigms about separation of powers would appear to be very
problematic. Certainly, distinctions turning on the details of
alienage versus U.S. citizenship, place of detention versus place
of capture, and Congress's AUMF versus possible suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus would seem to have been largely deter-
an authority that includes making virtually conclusive factual findings.
In my view, the structural considerations discussed above, as recog-
nized in our precedent, demonstrate that we lack the capacity and
responsibility to second-guess this determination.
Id. (citation omitted).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (2000).
39. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2655 (Souter,J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part, and concurring in the judgment) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)).
40. See id. at 2660, 2665 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.").
41. See id. at 2648 (the plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.,joined by Rehn-
quist, C.J., Kennedy, J., and Breyer, J.); id. at 2653 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined
by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 2668-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).
42. See Brief for the Respondents at 34-36, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct.
2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
43. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2652, 2660 (SouterJ., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part, and concurring in the judgment).
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minative. Still, fundamental differences over the interpretation
of the habeas corpus statute in Rasul and Padilla do not simply
reflect different readings of the same text and cases.
Some of the conflicts in these opinions are familiar ones
between constitutional balancing and originalism-i.e., Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion versus Justice Scalia's dissent in
Hamdi; and between textualism and non-textualism-i.e., Justice
Stevens' majority opinion in Rasul and dissent in Padilla versus
the ChiefJustice's majority opinion in Padilla and Justice Scalia's
dissent in Rasul. More noteworthy is that the Chief Justice and
Justices Scalia and Thomas agree on interpreting the habeas stat-
ute in Rasul and Padilla, but each then goes his separate constitu-
tional way in Hamdi.
Interpretation of federal statutes implicates separation of
powers in that the interpreter either does or does not accept that
the Constitution requires courts to make good-faith explications
of Congress's meaning as expressed in the text.4 4 Constitutional
interpretation differs "not because special principles of interpre-
tation apply, but because the usual principles are being applied
to an unusual text."4 5 The Constitution is unusual in that it is to
be read not as a list of "parchment barriers," but as institutional-
izing a system of separated powers.4 6 Especially on issues of war
and national security, which are rarely litigated, it matters greatly
under what paradigm a judge is operating. Until recently, as
reflected in Eisentrager,47 it would have been widely appreciated
that matters of war and national security were rarely litigated pre-
cisely because the Constitution provides the courts little basis for
intervening. Now, however, in an age of globalization, some jus-
tices are taking into consideration foreign and international legal
sources when interpreting the U.S. Constitution. It becomes all
the more necessary for originalists to be able to articulate how
separation of powers operates with respect to defense of the
44. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 9-10 (1997).
45. Id. at 37 (quoting thereafter from ChiefJustice Marshall's classic state-
ment about the nature of a constitution in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)).
46. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 5, at 332-33, 338 (questioning
propriety of "trust[ing] [mere] parchment barriers against the encroaching
spirit of power" between the several departments).
The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these observa-
tions is, that a mere demarkation on parchment of the constitutional
limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient guard against
those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all
the powers of government in the same hands.
Id. at 338.
47. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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country, including what distinctions there are between external
and internal use of the military, between the military and law
enforcement, and between the alien and the citizen.
II. THE CONSTITUTION'S PARADIGM FOR LIBERTY: DIVIDED
POWERS IN DOMESTIC MATTERS; UNIFIED POWER IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE
Neither libertarian nor statist paradigms are compatible with
the Constitution's particular version of separation of powers. Jus-
tice Ginsburg, for example, has articulated a libertarian para-
digm which globalizes human rights and would extend federal
judicial power as a check on the President worldwide.
4" This
view is similar to that of those who opposed the Constitution
49 in
distrusting a vigorous President as a threat to liberty. On the
contrary, the Framers considered a vigorous President necessary
to protect liberty."0 The Framers struck a certain balance in the
Constitution, and that does not include judicial balancing in mat-
ters of national defense. The President possesses a plenitude of
power over the powers granted.5 ' Reagan demonstrated that a
vigorous and effective President need not centralize as much
power as possible. Those powers are restrained because they are
much more clearly identified and, therefore, less threatening to
liberty than those of the Congress.
5 2
48. Ginsburg, supra note 19.
49. For an explanation and dcfense of the manner in which the principle
of separation of powers was implemented in the Constitution, see THE FEDERAL-
IST Nos. 47-48, supra note 5.
50. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 5.
There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous
executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government.
The enlightened well wishers to this species of government must at
least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation .... Energy
in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good gov-
ernment. It is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks ....
Id. at 471.
51. See THE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 5.
This is one of those truths, which to a correct and unprejudiced mind,
carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but can-
not be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms
as simple as they are universal. The means ought to be proportioned
to the end; the persons, from whose agency the attainment of any end is
expected, ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained.
Id. at 147.
52. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 5.
[I]n a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is care-
fully limited both in the extent and the duration of its power; and
where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is
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On the other side, statists have argued that the events of
September 11th have changed everything and require more
internal concentration of executive power. In fact, however, the
Framers reflected on and responded to the equally challenging
dangers of insurrection and war among the states. In structuring
federal power to address those and other dangers, they provided
constitutional power to use the military to maintain internal
order, if necessary.53 They understood, however, the dangers of
doing so and expected the operation of the Constitution to make
resort to internal use of military force a rare occurrence.5 4 In
Hamdi, despite the different positions taken by the Chief Justice
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, they all viewed the President's
inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an intrepid con-
fidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all
the passions which actuate a multitude; yet not so numerous as to be
incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which rea-
son prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this depart-
ment, that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust
all their precautions.
Id. at 333-34.
53. See THE FEDERALIST No. 28, supra note 5.
That there may happen cases, in which the national government may
be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experi-
ence has corroborated the lessons taught by examples of other
nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all socie-
ties, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are unhap-
pily maladies as inseparable from the body politic, as tumours and
eruptions from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all
times by the simple force of law (which we have been told is the only
admissible principle of republican government) has no place but in
the reveries of those political doctors, whose sagacity disdains the
admonitions of experimental instruction.
Id. at 176.
54. See THE FEDERALIST No. 8, supra note 5.
There is a wide difference also, between military establishment in a
country, seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in
one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them.
The rulers of the former can have no good pretext, if they are even so
inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be
maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely,
if at all, called into activity for interior defence, the people are in no
danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not
accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies-the civil
state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted nor confounded with the
principles or propensities of the other state.... The army under such
circumstances, may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small fac-
tion, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable to
enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of
the people.
Id. at 47-48.
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use of military powers within the territorial sovereignty of the
United States, at least as against citizens, differently from what
they said in Rasul about his use of those powers outside the
United States.
A. Basic Principles
It is axiomatic, according to The Federalist, that the federal
government has all the constitutional power necessary to defend
the nation, whether the threat comes from foreign attack or from
the breakdown of internal order:
These powers ought to exist without limitation: Because it
is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of
national exigencies, or the correspondent extent & variety
of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The
circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infi-
nite; and for this reason no constitutional shackles can
wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is
committed. This power ought to be co-extensive with all
the possible combinations of such circumstances; and
ought to be under the direction of the same councils,
which are appointed to preside over the common defense.
This is one of those truths, which... rests upon axioms as
simple as they are universal. The means ought to be pro-
portioned to the end; the persons, from whose agency the
attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess the
means by which it is to be attained.
5 5
The Supreme Court has confirmed the view that the Consti-
tution confers on the federal government an "independent sub-
stantive power" with respect to national security, and specifically
with respect to the "persons or property of [an] enemy found at
the time, within the territory" of the United States.
5 6 According
to the Court, these powers inhere in the national sovereignty,
rather than in any particular authority granted to the federal gov-
ernment in the Constitution.
57
In previous wars, except the Civil War, a fairly discernable
line has existed between external defense and internal police.
Thus, the Supreme Court has distinguished "between the powers
of the federal government in respect of foreign or external
affairs and those in respect of domestic or internal 
affairs."58
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 5, at 147 (emphasis added).
56. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125-26 (1814).
57. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-19
(1936).
58. Id. at 315.
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This same division has been reflected in federal legislation from
the Founding to the Civil War and since, after Reconstruction.
In 1792, Congress passed a law that limited presidential use of
military forces for domestic law enforcement to situations in
which ordinary means of law enforcement could not restore
order.5 9 During the Civil War and Reconstruction, Congress
expanded the internal use of military forces. In 1878, however,
Congress enacted the Posse Comitatus Act,6" which prohibits the
use of the military to execute the laws of the United States, the
states, or the territories, except as specifically provided. 1
The distinction between military and law enforcement pow-
ers is more than statutory. The federal government does have
law enforcement powers, but those powers have limits. In partic-
ular, the federal government has no general police power.6 2
Congress must find the source for enacting criminal law either in
particular enumerated powers or in the means necessary to
implement those powers.6" In matters of national security, on
the other hand, the powers of the federal government are
broader. The Constitution grants to the executive and legislative
branches, as the preamble announces, specific powers to "insure
domestic Tranquility and provide for the common defence."6 4
Most notable and relevant for present purposes are the powers of
the Congress under Article I, Section 8 to not only declare war,
but also to "define and punish . . .Offenses against the Law of
Nations"6 and to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water."6 6 Likewise, the role of the President, under Article
II, Section 2, as the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States"6 7 reflects the
Constitution's grant of authority to the executive branch to
address threats to national security independent of the Presi-
59. Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Construction and Application of Posse Comita-
tus Act (18 U.S.C.S. § 1385), and Similar Predecessor Provisions, Restricting Use of
United States Army and Air Force to Execute Laws, 141 A.L.R. FED. 271, 281 (1997).
60. "Posse Comitatus" means "power of the country." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1200 (8th ed. 2004).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
62. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (quoting
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) for the proposition that "[tlhe
Constitution .. .withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power").
63. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324-26 (1819).
64. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
65. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
66. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
67. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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dent's separate role as chief magistrate and prosecutor of crimi-
nal laws.
B. Application in "The War on Terrorism"
It is understandable that, in the immediate aftermath of the
terrorist attacks of September l1th, the knee-jerk reaction was to
consolidate power. The President, as Commander in Chief of
the military, operates within a centralized model. Moreover, the
tactics of the terrorists made it difficult to discern any distinction
between internal matters of law enforcement and external mat-
ters of defense. It is one thing to assert the proposition that a
strong President is essential to both the internal and external
defense of the country in order to preserve liberty. It does not
follow that the President's military powers exercised within the
U.S.-even though supported by Congress but without a suspen-
sion of the writ-can be exercised free of judicial scrutiny, as is
appropriate outside the sovereign territory of the United
States.6 8
Unfortunately, the Bush administration's approach to mili-
tary detention of two American citizens in the United States and
its use of law enforcement abroad were part of a pattern of blur-
ring law enforcement powers and war/foreign affairs powers.
6 9
While many of its politically appointed officials are conservatives
who, when out of power, advocate restraints on federal power,
that did not prevent adoption of policies which appear to reflect
the paradigm of a consolidated State. What prevented internal
consolidation from actually occurring was the institutional sepa-
ration of powers, which, in internal matters, certainly includes
68. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see also The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862), in which a majority of the Supreme
Court upheld President Lincoln's naval blockade of the Confederate States and
the seizure of ships bound to and from them. The Court distinguished between
Congress's power to declare war, which could be exercised only against a for-
eign power, not against a state, and Acts of Congress (1795 and 1807) which
duly authorized the President to suppress insurrections. Id.
69. See, e.g., Kevin Sack, Chasing Terrorists or Fears?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2004, at Al (compiling administration policy via remarks of Attorney General
Ashcroft).
In speech after speech, [Attorney General] Ashcroft recalled that
[Robert] Kennedy's Justice Department "would arrest mobsters for
spitting on the sidewalk." "Let the terrorists among us be warned,"
Ashcroft declared six weeks after the attacks. "If you overstay your visa,
even by one day, we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will
be put in jail and kept in custody as long as possible. We will use every
available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial advantage."
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the federal courts. The introduction of the courts into external
matters of national defense also prevents consolidation of
power-to the detriment not only of security, but also of liberty,
which the Founders equated in external matters vis-d-vis other
sovereign states. As The Federalist observes, "The direction of war
implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of
directing and employing the common strength, forms an usual
and essential part in the definition of executive authority. '"70
The Bush administration could have done better at articulat-
ing a defense of the Presidency and this President's policies in
terms of separation of powers where it is most needed, namely in
the use of military power outside the U.S. To do so, it would
have had to distinguish the external from the internal use of fed-
eral power and between law enforcement and military power. As
previously mentioned, however, both the Bush administration
and its critics have uncritically applied the term "war on terror-
ism" to both internal and external issues of federal power against
terrorists. With the "war" metaphor, the Bush administration has
adopted policies which are militarizing matters of internal law
enforcement. Thus, in the wake of September l1th, the Presi-
dent created for the first time a North American military com-
mand.7 Likewise, the creation of a Department of Homeland
Security and a new Intelligence Agency 72 reflect a merger of
some elements of national defense and law enforcement. Some
supporters of the administration have also proposed relaxing or
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 5, at 500.
71. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Transcript of Testimony by Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld on Homeland Security before Senate Appropria-
tions Committee (May 7, 2002), at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/
2002/s20020507-secdef.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Eth-
ics & Public Policy).
The president has approved a major revision of the command plan. Of
interest today is that it will establish a combatant command for home-
land defense, U.S. Northern Command, or what will undoubtedly be
called NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM will be devoted to defending the
people and territory of the United States against external threats and
to coordinating the provision of U.S. military forces to support civil
authorities.
In addition, NORTHCOM will be responsible for certain aspects
of security, cooperation and coordination with Canada and with Mex-
ico. It will also help DOD coordinate its military support to federal,
state and local governments in the event of natural or other disasters.
Id.
72. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638.
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eliminating the Posse Comitatus Act.73 While ordinary citizens
are not generally aware of these actions, they are conscious of
terror threat alerts and burdensome airport security. Collec-
tively, all these efforts may or may not have actually increased
security. They have, however, fostered the impression that,
increasingly, Americans are living in a garrison state, which the
Framers knew eventually destroys liberty.
74
This milieu has been ideal for libertarians to thrust federal
courts into foreign and military matters. Rasul75 extended fed-
eral court jurisdiction not only to habeas relief, but to other fed-
eral claims including the Alien Tort Act. 76 A day after issuing the
terrorism cases, the Supreme Court decided in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain77 that the Alien Tort Act allows federal courts to create
causes of action for violations of well-defined customary interna-
tional law norms. Citing the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, the Court's discussion indi-
cates that a "state policy" of "prolonged detention" might qual-
73. See Alison Mitchell, Domestic Security Plan on House Agenda, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 2002, at A1O.
Debate is also beginning on the Bush administration's call to con-
sider using the military for domestic law enforcement....
The Bush administration last week asked for a review of the Posse
Comitatus Act of 1878 and other laws that sharply restrict the mili-
tary's ability to participate in domestic law enforcement....
Mr. Ridge himself sounded cautious about how far the adminis-
tration would want to go in bringing the military into law
enforcement.
"I think that generally that goes against our instincts as a country,
to empower the military with the ability to arrest," Mr. Ridge said
today. "But it may come up as a part of a discussion. It does not mean
that it will ever be used or that the discussion will conclude that it even
should be used."
Id.
74. See THE FEDERALIST No. 8, supra note 5.
[T] he inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoid-
ably subjected to frequent infringements of their rights, which serve to
weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees, the people are
brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as
their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of consid-
ering them as masters, is neither remote, nor difficult: But it is very
difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a
bold, or effectual resistance, to usurpations, supported by the military
power.
Id. at 48.
75. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698-99 (2004).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
77. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
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ify.78 That gave the Guantanamo plaintiffs a lot to work with on
remand. It was precisely to prevent the possibility of judicial
oversight that the Bush administration refused to subscribe to
the treaty creating the International Criminal Court. If the seeds
planted by Rasul are allowed to blossom, the use of American
military force would be subjected to broad judicial oversight-
not through international criminal jurisdiction under the Inter-
national Criminal Court, but with similar intrusion on the Com-
mander in Chief powers of the American President.
III. DISTINGUISHING WAR AND POLICE POWERS
Those who reject the extension of judicial oversight to mili-
tary matters beyond our borders are left still to discern an
originalist understanding for the use of military power within the
territorial sovereignty of the United States. Of the three dissent-
ers in Rasul, the Chief Justice has sided with the constitutional
balancers in the Hamdi plurality. They believe they must balance
"the tension that often exists between the autonomy that the
Government asserts is necessary in order to pursue effectively a
particular goal and the process that a citizen contends he is due
before he is deprived of a constitutional right. ' 79 This kind of
balancing, which bespeaks judicial supremacy, is consistent with
both libertarian and statist paradigms. That is to say, the Court
acts in a statist mode insofar as it refashions the Constitution's
allocation of and checks on the use of military power8" and in a
libertarian mode insofar as it grants liberties not provided
through the text and structure of the Constitution.
To many judicial supremacists, it may seem that, especially
in the absence of a clear, controlling, constitutional text, the
78. Id. at 2768-69 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987)).
79. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2646 (2004).
80. Dissenting in Hamdi, Justice Scalia states:
There is a certain harmony of approach in the plurality's making up
for Congress's failure to invoke the Suspension Clause and its making
up for the Executive's failure to apply what it says are needed proce-
dures-an approach that reflects what might be called a Mr. Fix-it
Mentality. The plurality seems to view it as its mission to Make Every-
thing Come Out Right, rather than merely to decree the conse-
quences, as far as individual rights are concerned, of the other two
branches' actions and omissions.... The problem with this approach
is not only that it steps out of the courts' modest and limited role in a
democratic society; but that by repeatedly doing what it thinks the
political branches ought to do it encourages their lassitude and saps
the vitality of government by the people.
Id. at 2673 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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choice is between judicial balancing and no judicial role. Con-
tained therein is the unstated premise that only the courts pro-
tect liberty. As established by the Framers, the judiciary's
important role, however, was part of the larger design for pro-
tecting liberty through separation of powers."' In considering
the judicial role in Hamdi, the three other opinions-those by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and even Souter 2-pay attention to con-
stitutional structure and give more weight to the roles of the
other branches.
The two reliable originalists on the Court, Justices Scalia and
Thomas, were diametrically opposed in Hamdi on the President's
power over American citizens detained inside the U.S. during
wartime. Justice Scalia observed, however, that his point was a
very narrow one.83 While he determined that the Constitution
did not authorize the President's detention of Hamdi because
Congress had not suspended the writ of habeas corpus as pro-
vided in Article I, he denied that the Court had any further role
in the matter.8 4 Both justices, in other words, saw a very limited
role for the Court. The differences between the two justices
force originalists to consider who has the better explanation of
the Framers' understanding regarding the paradigm for protect-
ing liberty within the U.S. in time of war. Whatever the original
paradigm, it should guide particular policies in attempting to
meet today's challenges created by the eroding of national bor-
ders. Without such guidance, the difficulties of dealing with con-
current internal and external terrorism threats make the
simplicity of the statist and libertarian paradigms very attractive.
A. Ex Parte Quirin and Ex Parte Milligan
The differences between Justices Scalia and Thomas are
reflected in their treatment of Ex Parte Quinin8 5 and Ex Parte Milli-
gan.8 6 Arguably, the Government could draw from Quiin and
Milligan a distinction between a belligerent who threatens the
81. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51, supra note 5, for a discus-
sion of separation of powers.
82. See 124 S. Ct. at 2652, 2655 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part, and concurring in the judgment) (quoting FEDERALIST No. 51, supra
note 5, on separation of powers).
83. Id. at 2673 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Several limitations give my views in
this matter a relatively narrow compass. They apply only to citizens, accused of
being enemy combatants, who are detained within the territorial jurisdiction of
the federal court.").
84. See id. at 2671, 2673-74.
85. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
86. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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national security at the service of a foreign enemy and a civilian
whose crime-although it may involve aiding and abetting an
enemy in time of war-is subject to the jurisdiction of traditional
law enforcement (rather than military) authority. Under that
reading, the latter would enjoy the constitutional protections of
an accused in ordinary courts and the former could be tried in
military courts. In Hamdi, however, the point was that the Gov-
ernment detained Hamdi without any intention of trying him
even in a military court."7 According to the plurality, that was
acceptable under the AUMF because "nothing in Quiin suggests
that his citizenship would have precluded his mere detention for
the duration of the relevant hostilities. "88
Ex Parte Quirin89 concerned a group of commandos who
were landed by German U-boats on U.S. beaches during World
War I.90 Their assignment from the German military authorities
was to destroy military targets and war-production facilities on
the homefront.9 1 All of the commandos were Germans except
one, Haupt, who claimed to be a naturalized U.S. citizen. After
capture by the FBI, the commandos were placed in military cus-
tody.9 2 Pursuant to an executive order, they were tried by a mili-
tary commission, which found them all guilty and sentenced
them to death. They then filed petitions for writs of habeas
corpus, challenging the authority of the military tribunal and the
tribunal's denial of their constitutional rights, as specified in Arti-
cle III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
9 3
The Supreme Court upheld the military commission's
authority. The Court concluded that the President, as Com-
mander in Chief has the power to enforce all laws relating to the
conduct of war, "and to carry into effect.., all laws defining and
punishing offenses against the law of nations, including those
which pertain to the conduct of war."9 4 This power, the Court
held, includes the authority "to seize and subject to disciplinary
measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or
impede our military effort have violated the law of war."9 5
The Court likewise rejected the would-be saboteurs' claim to
the traditional constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused in the
87. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641.
88. Id. at 2640.
89. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
90. Id. at 21.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 24.
94. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26.
95. Id. at 28-29.
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criminal justice system. The Court concluded, first, that the sab-
oteurs were not criminal defendants, but rather were unlawful
belligerents accused of violating the laws of war.96 "[A] n enemy
combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines
for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property,
are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally
deemed... to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals."97
The Court next rejected the commandos' claim that, having
been captured by FBI agents on U.S. soil, they enjoyed constitu-
tional rights under Article III and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments:
We conclude that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not
restrict whatever authority was conferred by the Constitu-
tion to try offenses against the law of war by military com-
mission, and that petitioners, charged with such an offense
not required to be tried byjury at common law, were law-
fully placed on trial by the Commission without a jury.
98
Finally, the Court in Quiin readily rejected Haupt's claim of
constitutional rights by virtue of his purported U.S. citizenship.9 9
U.S. citizenship, the Court held, "does not relieve him from the
consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in vio-
lation of the law of war." ° ° By virtue of his allegiance to a for-
eign enemy and his taking up arms on behalf of that enemy,
therefore, Haupt was subject to military punishment, rather than
criminal justice.
Was this distinction between an unlawful belligerent and a
traitorous civilian well-grounded in the Constitution and consti-
tutional precedent? Should that distinction be viewed as the
definitive boundary between the government's national security
power and its law enforcement authority? After the Civil War, Ex
Parte Milligan1 . considered the conviction by a military tribunal
of a U.S. citizen, resident in Indiana, who was accused of conspir-
ing to aid the cause of the Confederacy, then at war with the
96. Id. at 36.
97. Id. at 31.
98. Id. at 45; see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 23 (1946) (rejecting a
Fifth Amendment challenge to the introduction of hearsay evidence in a prose-
cution before a military commission) ("[T] he commission's rulings on evidence
and on the mode of conducting these proceedings against petitioner are not
reviewable by the courts .... From this viewpoint it is unnecessary to consider
what, in other situations, the Fifth Amendment might require.. .
99. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38.
100. Id. at 37.
101. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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United States. The Court unanimously overturned the convic-
tion. Although the Court divided on the question of the tribu-
nal's authority,1 ° it concluded that "no usage of war could
sanction a military trial there for any offence whatever of a citi-
zen in civil life, [who] in no way is connected with the military
service.""' 3  The Court in Quiin distinguished Milligan as
presenting a different case with different constitutional questions
than the case before it. Quirin said Milligan involved a citizen
who "was not an enemy belligerent ... subject to the penalties
imposed upon unlawful belligerents .... [Milligan was not] a
part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a
non-belligerent, not subject to the law of war save as ... martial
law might be constitutionally established."
10 4
B. Justice Thomas Versus Justice Scalia
The disagreement between Justices Scalia and Thomas con-
cerns Milligan, Quirin, and their understanding of the Suspen-
sion Clause. Justice Thomas argues that Ex Parte Milligan
supports Justice Scalia's position, but he contends Quifin over-
ruled Milligan.1 °5 More than anyone else on the Court, however,
Justice Thomas is willing to overturn well-established precedent if
it does not properly interpret the Constitution. l0 6 So what Jus-
tice Thomas means is that Quifin, rather than Milligan, reflects
the correct reading of the Constitution. His real concern,
although labeled "an additional concern,"'0 7 is the question:
Does the constitutional provision for suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus provide the nation sufficient power to defend
itself in all circumstances?
Justice Scalia apparently does not disagree that the federal
government has all power necessary to protect the nation. If
criminal processes do not suffice, however, Justice Scalia would
require Congress to suspend the writ."0 But the fact that the
writ may not be suspended "unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
102. The majority refused to consider the scope of the military tribunal's
authority in this context, although the minority readily acknowledged the
authority of such a tribunal that is "exercised in time of invasion or insurrection
within the limits of the United States .. .when the public danger requires its
exercise." 71 U.S. at 121; see also id. at 142 (opinion of Taney, C.J. and Wayne,
Swayne and Miller, JJ.).
103. Id. at 121-22.
104. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45.
105. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2682 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
106. See KEN FoSKETr, JUDGING THoMAs 281-82 (2004).
107. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2682 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
108. See id. at 2674 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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Invasion the public Safety may require it,"' " poses two related
problems. First, this condition might not obtain here or during
many other emergencies during which this detention authority
might be necessary. Congress would then have to choose
between acting unconstitutionally and depriving the President of
the tools he needs to protect the nation. Second, I do not see
how suspension would make constitutional otherwise unconstitu-
tional detentions ordered by the President. It simply removes a
remedy. Justice Scalia's position might therefore require one or
both of the political branches to act unconstitutionally in order
to protect the nation. But the power to protect the nation must
be the power to do so lawfully. °
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi and, initially
afterwards, my views more or less corresponded to those
expressed by Justice Thomas. Of course, for an originalist, it is
difficult ever to disagree with Justice Scalia's interpretations of
the Constitution. In changing my own mind, I was persuaded
both by justice Scalia's arguments and by justice Thomas' inade-
quate rebuttal thereto.
As indicated in the quote above, Justice Thomas follows the
Framers in saying that the federal government has all the powers
necessary to defend the nation against invasion and insurrection
and that therefore the government should not have to violate the
Constitution in order to preserve the nation. He does not, how-
ever, support his claim that the conditions for suspending the
writ "might not obtain here or during many other emergencies
during which this detention authority might be necessary." '
Although he does not so specify, he may have in mind that the
modus operandi of the terrorists does not fit that of a classic mili-
tary invasion. The constitutional text, however, does not specify
"military invasion," although undoubtedly that is what most con-.
cerned the Framers.1 12 The term "invasion," from its Latin deri-
vation, means "coming in." The two circumstances-"Rebellion
and Invasion"-which are prerequisites for suspension, refer to
the two possible sources of threats to public safety-internal and
external. The language for suspension in "cases of Rebellion and
Invasion," then, would seem to be virtually exhaustive."' 3
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
110. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2682-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 2683.
112. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, supra note 5, at 155-57.
113. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2674 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "It is difficult to
imagine situations in which security is so seriously threatened as to justify indefi-
nite imprisonment without trial, and yet the constitutional conditions of rebel-
lion or invasion are not met." Id.
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The dilemma Justice Thomas sees dissolves under a proper
reading of the text. Moreover, Justice Thomas shares Justice
Scalia's view that a suspension of the writ by Congress would not
be reviewable by the Court.1 14 Justice Thomas's concern that
Congress's suspension of the writ would not make presidential
acts constitutional, if they were not otherwise, misapprehends the
Constitution's structure. With a proper suspension of the writ,
Congress acts pursuant to the Constitution and, therefore, the
President does not act in violation of the Constitution by using
detention without trial. As fundamental as the writ is to liberty,
survival of the nation is even more fundamental. Without the
nation, courts do not exist to hear any writs. In other words, the
Constitution's text and structure recognize a hierarchy of goods,
with national security at the top. When public safety requires,
the rights citizens normally enjoy are suspended along with the
writ.
Certainly, even in the wake of the attacks of September 11 th,
Congress would have given the extremely careful scrutiny before
approving any suspension of the writ, no matter how restricted
was the requested suspension. 15 Approval for the AUMF was
less difficult to obtain because it involved the use of military force
against an enemy coming from abroad. Little, if any thought was
given to the possibility that an American could be among the
enemy. A request for a suspension of the writ would have forced
Americans to consider whether temporary suspension of their
individual liberties was necessary to preserve the liberty of the
nation against Americans who had joined or cooperated with the
enemy.
CONCLUSION
The Bush administration has waged the "war on terrorism"
without clearly distinguishing military power from internal law
enforcement. Originalist Justices Scalia and Thomas disagree as
to whether the military power can be applied to a U.S. citizen
labeled an enemy combatant and held inside U.S. sovereign terri-
tory. This disagreement, as important as it is, should not over-
shadow their fundamental agreement on national defense
matters. The two justices do agree that courts cannot interfere
with the President's use of military power outside sovereign U.S.
territory. While critics claim President Bush's policies threaten
114. Id. at 2683 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115. See Justice Scalia's references to the fact that Congress can impose
conditions and restrictions on a suspension of the writ. Id. at 2671-72 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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liberty at home, it can just as well be said that the Supreme
Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush 6 threatens the liberty of the
nation.
Both President Bush and his critics have ignored divisions of
power both between the United States and other countries and
within the United States. On the one hand, Bush's "war on ter-
rorism" has been militarizing internal police powers, even while
creating a non-militarized police force in Iraq. On the other
hand, President Bush's libertarian critics and a majority of the
Supreme Court have been judicializing war, while ignoring the
constitutional limits on judicial power. These counter-tenden-
cies reflect different paradigms of power, internally and exter-
nally. Neither, however, is faithful to the structure of power
provided in the Constitution.
These two warring paradigms mistakenly make it appear that
national security and individual liberty are in conflict and that
increasing the one necessarily reduces the other.'1 7 As the Fram-
ers explained, no such conflict need exist in our "well-con-
structed" Constitution."" Today, as at the Founding, there are
those who reject the proposition that a strong Presidency is nec-
116. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
117. The Founders well understood the difficult tradeoff between safety
and freedom. Hamilton declared:
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national
conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to
its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to
war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual
danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort for
repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy
their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they, at length,
become willing to run the risk of being less free.
THE FEDERALIST No. 8, supra note 5, at 33. The Founders warned us about the
risk and equipped us with a Constitution designed to deal with it. Hamdi, 124 S.
Ct. at 2660, 2674 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. See THE FEDERALIST No. 1, supra note 5, at 5-6.
An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will
be stigmatized as the off-spring of a temper fond of despotic power
and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of
danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault
of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretence
and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of public good.
It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual con-
comitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm for liberty is apt to be
infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other
hand, it will be equally forgotten, that the vigour of government is
essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a
sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be sepa-
rated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the
specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the for-
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essary for protecting liberty. Today, as at the Founding, there are
those who would weaken the necessary unity of a strong Presi-
dency by subjecting the actions of the Commander in Chief to
oversight by others.'1 9 Today, unlike at the Founding, those who
would weaken the external exercise of the President's Com-
mander in Chief powers look to the federal courts to dilute its
unity. 120
Rasul's ruling that federal courts have habeas jurisdiction
over foreign nationals captured abroad and incarcerated in
Guantanamo Bay undermines the President's Commander in
Chief powers. The decision itself is not a constitutional one
because it purports to interpret a federal habeas corpus statute.
That interpretation, however, does not rest on a reasonable inter-
pretation of the text. Rather, it reflects what a majority see to be
their role in extending liberty. It is based on a paradigm ofjudi-
cial and presidential powers inimical to the Constitution. Con-
gress can correct the decision by amending the habeas corpus
statute. Would Congress be willing to do so? That may depend
on the ability of the President to persuade the Congress, and the
American people, that Rasul undermines, rather than advances,
the cause of liberty. To make that case, it would help for the
Bush administration to confess error on having detained Ameri-
cans as "enemy combatants" in the U.S. without trial. 12 1
As Justice Scalia observed, Hamdi's situation-an American
citizen held in the U.S. for aiding an enemy-apparently applied
only to two other people.' One of those two-Lindh-had
bidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of
government.
Id.
119. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 5.
The ingredients, which constitute energy in the executive, are, first,
unity .... This unity may be destroyed in two ways; either by vesting
the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or
by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in whole or in part to the control
and cooperation of others .... In the conduct of a war, in which the
energy of the executive is the bulwark of the national security, every
thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.
Id. at 472-73, 476 (emphasis added).
120. Even before the Supreme Court's decision in RasulJustice Ginsburg
was very outspoken in her hope to subject the Executive's exercise of power
outside the United States. See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 5, 8.
121. Compare the change of position by the Justice Department's Office
of Legal Counsel on the question of U.S. adherence to international treaties
banning torture. See Douglas Kmiec, Wise Counsel, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 5, 2005, at
A] 0.
122. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2664, 2673 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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been indicted and pled guilty.1 23 The other-Padilla-was still
being held. 124 After the decision in Hamdi, a release of Hamdi
was negotiated. If the administration had afforded Hamdi and
Padilla---as U.S. citizens-the same treatment afforded Lindh, it
would have diffused much of the argument that the administra-
tion was threatening liberty. Then, it would have been in a much
better position to defend its position about holding the non-U.S.
prisoners at Guantanamo. With greater credibility, the President
would have been better able to persuade that Rasul undermines
his constitutional authority to protect the nation's liberty.
123. Id. at 2664.
124. Id. at 2673.
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